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custom adoption in Canada. Settler state recognition of custom 
adoption in each province and territory is discussed and the possibility 
of conflation between custom adoption and settler state adoption is 
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strengthening Indigenous self-governance over child welfare so long 
as the conflation of diverse practices is rejected, and recognition is 
accompanied by control and support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous custom adoption is an exercise of self-governance over child 
welfare. It is the application of Indigenous customary law, on Indigenous land, 
by and for Indigenous people. There is an urgent need to strengthen self-
governance over child welfare, informed by the current Indigenous child welfare 
crisis. One can begin to define and understand Indigenous custom adoption by 
recognizing divergent ideas of family as well as the basic structure and effects of 
settler state adoption. Settler state recognition of custom adoption in each 
province and territory is discussed, with particular attention paid to the 
deleterious effects of conflating custom adoption and settler state adoption. 
Statutory regimes have a role in strengthening Indigenous customary law so long 
as the conflation of diverse practices is REJECTED, and recognition is 
accompanied by community control and support from government bodies. 
Robust statutory recognition of Indigenous custom adoption requires legislation 
that respects custom adoption as an exercise of self-governance, with its effects 
determined by Indigenous communities and custom. 
THE CURRENT INDIGENOUS CHILD WELFARE CRISIS 
The urgent need to strengthen self-governance over child welfare must be 
understood in the context of the current Indigenous child welfare crisis. A 
culturally incompatible, inadequately funded system has been imposed on 
Indigenous communities for decades. The current system is informed by 
historical and ongoing colonialism. There is “a linear path from colonization 
through to the Indian Residential Schools to the Sixties Scoop to today's over-
representation of Aboriginal children in care.”1 There are three times more 
Indigenous children in child welfare care today than there were at the height of 
residential schools.2 Child welfare justifies the assertion of control over 
Indigenous communities through interventions into Indigenous families. These 
 
1 Peter Choate & Gabrielle Lindstrom, “Parenting Capacity Assessment as Colonial Strategy” (2017) 37 Can 
Fam LQ 45 at 47. 
2 Ibid at 56. 
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interventions are “merely more recent iterations of colonial strategies of removal, 
abuse, and theft, not only of Indigenous children, but of their culture and land.”3 
Government attempts to involve Indigenous communities in settler state 
child welfare have had minimal success. First Nations child and family services 
agencies were developed to keep Indigenous children in their communities; 
however, these agencies’ efforts have been stifled by a lack of control and 
funding.4 These agencies operate under provincial child welfare legislation and 
receive funding from the federal government. The funding they receive is twenty-
two percent less than their government counterparts.5 Agencies have little 
opportunity to create and implement their own solutions when they must 
“operate within a legal straitjacket.”6 
There is hope that the recent First Nations Child and Family Caring Society 
decision will provoke government action that recognizes the urgent need for self-
governance over child welfare.7 In the 2016 decision, the Canadian Human Rights 
Tribunal found that First Nations children and families living on reserve are 
discriminated against in the provision of child and family services by Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada (“AANDC”).8 The Tribunal’s 
decision states that AANDC’s “design, management and control of the [First 
Nations Child and Family Services] Program, along with its corresponding 
funding formulas and the other related provincial/territorial agreements have 
resulted in denials of services and created various adverse impacts for many First 
Nations children and families living on reserves.”9 The Panel found “these 
adverse impacts perpetuate the historical disadvantage and trauma suffered by 
Aboriginal people, in particular as a result of the Residential Schools system.”10 
 
3 Lara di Tomasso & Sandrina de Finney, “A Discussion Paper on Indigenous Custom Adoption Part 1: 
Severed Connections - Historical Overview of Indigenous Adoption in Canada” (2015) 10:1 First Peoples 
Child & Family Rev 7 at 7 [di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”]. 
4 Cindy Blackstock, “Residential Schools: Did They Really Close or Just Morph into Child Welfare?” (2007) 
6 Indigenous LJ 71 at 74. 
5 Ashley Smith, “Aboriginal Adoptions in Saskatchewan and British Columbia: An Evolution to Save or 
Lose Our Children?” (2009) 25 Can J Fam L 297 at 351-352. 
6 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 74. 
7 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2, 83 CHRR D/207. 
8 Ibid at para 473. 
9 Ibid at para 458. 
10 Ibid at para 459. 
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In addition to finding discrimination, the panel ordered AANDC to cease its 
discriminatory practices and take measures to redress and prevent them.11 
Although there have already been several compliance orders issued against 
the government which have not been followed,12 this finding of discrimination 
by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal remains a powerful tool in demanding 
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. The settler state child welfare 
system is failing Indigenous children and families. Armed with this decision, 
Indigenous communities can continue their fight for increased self-governance 
over child welfare. 
DIVERGENT IDEAS OF FAMILY 
Divergent ideas of family inform the differences between the settler state 
child welfare system and the ways in which Indigenous communities govern their 
own child welfare. While many Indigenous worldviews value extended kinship, 
the Canadian settler state perceives the ideal family form as the heteronormative 
nuclear family.13 Dominant ideologies of family and mothering are integrated into 
the settler state child welfare system, while Indigenous beliefs and practices are 
devalued.14 Generally, within the settler state conception of family, childrearing is 
considered the task of the individual mother, who must be a self-sufficient 
primary caregiver requiring minimal assistance.15 Any difficulties in childrearing 
are attributed to personal deficiencies of the ‘bad mother’ which provides a 
justification for state intrusion.16  
 
11 Ibid at para 481. 
12 Re First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Canada (Attorney General), 2016 CHRT 10, 83 
CHRR D/266; First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v Attorney General of Canada 
(representing the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2017 CHRT 7, 2017 CarswellNat 1792; First 
Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2017 CHRT 14, 86 CHRR D/294. 
13 Lara di Tomasso & Sandrina de Finney, “A Discussion Paper on Indigenous Custom Adoption Part 2: 
Honouring Our Caretaking Traditions” (2015) 10:1 First Peoples Child & Family Rev 19 at 20 [di Tomasso 
& de Finney, “Part 2”]. 
14 Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women” 
(1993) 18 Queen’s LJ 306 at 318. 
15 Ibid at 328. 
16 Ibid at 319-320. 
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In stark contrast to this, Indigenous children must be understood as being 
raised within a community: “any assessment that sees a parent in isolation of that 
will be deficient and is only assessing one small part of the support system.”17 
The participation of extended kin in childrearing is often insufficiently recognized 
by the settler state.18 The role and contributions of extended family are obscured 
in favour of an individualized parenting assessment.19  
Concentrating on the individual parent also fails to recognize that their 
difficulties have roots in historical and ongoing practices of colonialism.20 The 
focus on individual ‘bad mothers’ “effectively blames First Nation women for the 
effects of social ills that are largely the consequence of this history and present.”21 
This means settler state child protection does not differentiate between 
circumstances a parent can change and factors beyond their control. Neglect is a 
particularly insidious ground in this regard. While Indigenous children are less 
likely than non-Indigenous children to be reported to child protection authorities 
for abuse and exposure to domestic violence, they are twice as likely to be 
reported for neglect.22 This overrepresentation is attributed to caregiver poverty, 
poor housing, and substance misuse.23 Indigenous children are being removed 
from their families due to manifestations of systemic inequality beyond their 
parents’ control. Child protection assessments within the settler state system 
operate as “a repetitive circle where risk is assessed based upon current 
expressions of colonialism.”24 
Many Indigenous worldviews emphasize community involvement in dealing 
with factors outside the individual parent’s control.25 Rather than considering 
poverty a reason to remove a child, it can act as “a signal to society to redistribute 
resources.”26 Multiple caregivers are a common way Indigenous children receive 
support and connect to their communities.27 Instead of removing children from 
 
17 Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 53. 
18 Kline, supra note 14 at 331. 
19 Ibid at 332. 
20 Ibid at 318. 
21 Ibid at 321. 
22 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 75. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 52. 
25 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 73. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 54. 
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their homes because of perceived personal deficiencies of their parents, 
caregiving responsibilities are shared between community members in a way that 
acknowledges root causes and systemic challenges. While the settler state 
understands the family as an atomistic unit, many Indigenous worldviews favour 
a communal understanding. The use of extended kin in childrearing does not 
demonstrate deficiencies in Indigenous families, it demonstrates the ongoing 
resilience of Indigenous communities.28 When Indigenous communities govern 
their own child welfare, their ideas of the family and traditional caregiving 
practices can be honoured. 
SETTLER STATE ADOPTION 
It is important to acknowledge that many Indigenous children remain in 
institutional or long-term foster care with little prospect of adoption.29 While the 
statistics for long-term foster care for Indigenous children have skyrocketed, the 
statistics for transracial adoptions have plummeted.30 Even if the child does 
receive an adoption placement, the rate of Indigenous adoption “breakdowns” 
(the child leaving the home before the age of majority) is currently at ninety-five 
percent.31 This breakdown rate has largely been attributed to “feelings of loss, 
shame, disconnection, and abandonment surrounding identity and kinship”, 
particularly when placed in non-Indigenous homes.32 
Settler state adoption has, until recently, meant a forced, external, and closed 
process.33 Closed adoptions of Indigenous children into non-Indigenous families 
“effectively ruptured the transfer of ancestral knowledge, culture, and 
language.”34 These severed connections have inter-generational impacts.35 Now, 
Canada is seeing a move towards more open adoption procedures and regimes.36 
 
28 Ibid at 50. 
29 Raven Sinclair, “Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties Scoop” (2007) 3:1 First Peoples Child 
& Family Rev 65 at 68.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Smith, supra note 5 at 332. 
32 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 11. 
33 Ibid at 9.  
34 Ibid at 10-11. 
35 Ibid at 11. 
36 Cindy L. Baldassi, “The Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across Canada: Comparisons, 
Contrasts, and Convergences” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 63 at 99. 
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However, the important distinction must be made between open records and 
open adoption.37 Open records focus on information disclosure, while open 
adoption emphasizes maintaining connection with the birth family. The 
important distinction between these two concepts is often obfuscated.  
There is now also increased awareness of the importance of cultural 
planning for Indigenous adoptees, but cultural planning carries the risk of 
reduction and essentialism.38 While cultural planning can be a useful tool, 
stereotypical cultural planning may “amplify disconnection and shame in foster 
and adoptive placements by trivializing the child’s Indigenous culture and 
disregarding diversity within and among Indigenous societies.”39 
INDIGENOUS CUSTOM ADOPTION 
Indigenous custom adoption is often conflated with settler state adoption, 
but there are significant differences between the two which must be understood. 
Settler state adoption severs family ties. The adoption process terminates the birth 
parents’ legal rights and obligations and assigns them to new parents.40 Settler 
state adoptions are intended to be permanent.41 
Self-governance is strengthened through the resurgence of Indigenous 
customary law. Custom adoption must be defined by Indigenous communities. 
To assist comprehension of how custom adoption differs from settler state 
adoption, some common characteristics must be defined. Custom adoption 
should be understood from within Indigenous worldviews and their ideas of the 
family. In this section, settler state recognition of custom adoption is discussed 
and the potential to conflate custom adoption with settler state adoption is 
highlighted and cautioned against.  
 
37 Jeannine Carriere & Sandra Scarth, “Aboriginal Children: Maintaining Connections in Adoption” in  Ivan 
Brown et al, eds, Putting a Human Face on Child Welfare: Voices from the Prairies (Regina: Prairie Child Welfare 
Consortium/Centre of Excellence for Child Welfare, 2007) 203 at 212. 
38 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 13. 
39 Ibid at 14.  
40 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 66-67. 
41 Quebec, Report of the Working Group on Customary Adoption in Aboriginal Communities , (Quebec: Government 
of Quebec, 2012) at 33 [Working Group Report]. 
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Defining and Understanding 
Indigenous custom adoption is a broad term referring to caregiving practices 
of diverse Indigenous communities.42 Custom adoption is also known as 
customary, cultural, or traditional adoption.43 The term ‘adoption’ is imperfect; 
Indigenous languages typically have no equivalent word since Indigenous 
caregiving practices do not sever children from their birth families and 
communities.44 Some Elders find the term unacceptable due to the connotation 
of permanent removal of children from their communities.45 Although a loaded 
and contested term, custom adoption is intended to convey “Indigenous 
alternatives to the wholesale separation of families and communities that has been 
perpetrated throughout colonial settler states.”46 The term has been useful for 
settler state comprehension, but has also become a stumbling block when 
inaccurate understandings of custom adoption infuse government recognition.47 
Special attention must be paid to the differences between settler state adoption 
and custom adoption to prevent inaccurate understanding and conflation of the 
two practices.48 
Indigenous custom adoption differs from settler state adoption in four 
important ways. Four important features of Indigenous custom adoption include: 
1. They often involve kin and rarely involve strangers;  
 
2. They are about kin and community relationships rather 
than parenthood;  
 
3. The needs of the children, adults, and relatives are all 
considered; and  
 
 
42 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 20. 
43 Ibid at 19. 
44 Ibid at 19-20. 
45 Marilyn Poitras & Norman Zlotkin, “An Overview of the Recognition of Customary Adoption in Canada” 
(Saskatoon: Saskatchewan First Nations Family and Community Institute Inc., 2013) at 24. 
46 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 20. 
47 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 21-22. 
48 Ibid at 22. 
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4. Agreements are developed jointly by the birth and 
adoptive families, with continued contact between all parties 
encouraged.49  
Rather than severing ties, custom adoption strives to strengthen relationships.50  
Custom adoption is utilized in diverse circumstances for myriad reasons. 
Although some arrangements may become permanent out of necessity, the 
concept of permanency is not emphasized.51 Custom adoptions are frequently a 
temporary form of reciprocal caregiving.52 A variety of alternative parenting 
arrangements may be put in place to address the needs of children, families, and 
the community.53 They may be used to ensure children are adequately cared for 
and receive traditional knowledge from elders and community members.54 The 
birth family is temporarily relieved from childrearing responsibilities and the child 
will be able to receive support and  provide assistance in the adoptive home. 
Fundamentally, it is “a positive rather than a reactive intervention.”55 The 
Indigenous child and a wide web of community members cultivate trusting 
relationships and gain greater understanding of reciprocal care and community 
responsibility.56  
Federal Legislation: The Indian Act and Bill C-92 
The federal Indian Act defines ‘child’ as including “a legally adopted child 
and a child adopted in accordance with Indian custom.”57 Children adopted 
through either process can be granted official Indian status.58 This recognition of 
custom adoption in the definition section has not been interpreted as providing 
any additional adoption rights that would give rise to federal paramountcy over 
provincial legislation. 
Bill C-92: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and 
families (the “Act”) was tabled in the House of Commons on April 29, 2019. It 
 
49 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 21. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 23-24. 
52 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 21. 
53 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 15. 
54 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 23. 
55 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 29. 
56 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 23. 
57 Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, s 2(1). 
58 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 87. 
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received royal assent on June 21, 2019 but is not yet in force. The purpose of the 
Bill is to “affirm the rights and jurisdiction of Indigenous peoples in relation to 
child and family services and to set out principles applicable, on a national level, 
to the provision of child and family services in relation to Indigenous children.”59  
Clause 9 provides that the Act is to be administered in accordance with the 
principles of the best interests of the child, cultural continuity, and substantive 
equality. Clause 11 provides that child and family services are to be administered 
in a manner that: 
a) Takes into account the child’s needs, including with 
respect to his or her physical, emotional and psychological 
safety, security and well-being; 
b) Takes into account the child’s culture; 
c) Allows the child to know his or her family origins; and 
d) Promotes substantive equality between the child and 
other children.60 
Clause 4 reads “[F]or greater certainty, nothing in this Act affects the 
application of a provision of a provincial Act or regulation to the extent that the 
provision does not conflict with, or is not consistent with, the provisions of this 
Act.”61 It is not entirely clear how conflicts and inconsistencies between 
provincial law, Indigenous law, and the Act will be defined and resolved. Clause 
22 provides that where a conflict or inconsistency exists between the Act or 
provincial legislation regarding child and family services and the laws of an 
Indigenous group, the law of the Indigenous group prevails. However, this 
paramountcy of Indigenous law is curtailed by clause 23, which dictates that if 
the Indigenous law would be contrary to the best interests of the child, it does 
not apply. Clause 10 enumerates the factors to be considered in determining the 
“best interests of Indigenous child.” These include: 
 
59 Canada, Department of Justice, “Bill C-92: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and 
families”, (29 April 2019), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/c92.html>. 
60 Bill C-92, An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, cl 
11, (assented to 21 June 2019), SC 2019, c 24. 
61 Ibid, cl 4. 
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a. The child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and 
heritage;  
b. The child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such 
as the child’s need for stability; 
c. The nature and strength of the child’s relationship with his or her parent, 
the care provider and any member of his or her family who plays an 
important role in his or her life; 
d. The importance to the child of preserving the child’s cultural identity and 
connections to the language and territory of the Indigenous group, 
community or people to which the child belongs; 
e. The child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age 
and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained; 
f. Any plans for the child’s care, including care in accordance with the 
customs or traditions of the Indigenous group, community or people to 
which the child belongs;  
g. Any family violence and its impact on the child, including whether the 
child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence as well as the 
physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child; 
and 
h. Any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is 
relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.  
Subclause 10(4) indicates that these factors, to the extent possible, are to be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of the Indigenous group to which 
the child belongs.62 This provides at least some assurance that the Legislature’s 
conception of the best interests of the child will not override those of the child’s 
community. 
When Bill C-92 was first made public in February 2019, Assembly of First 
Nations national Chief Perry Bellegarde offered his praise of it. However, several 
First Nations chiefs in B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario have since 
criticized the Bill, fearing that it fails to respect the First Nations’ sovereignty.63 
 
62 Ibid, cl 10(4).  
63 “First Nations chiefs call for protests to oppose Indigenous child welfare bill”, CBC News (8 May 2019), 
online: <www.cbc.ca>.  
40 STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS CUSTOM ADOPTION Vol. 28 
 
One major concern is that it does not provide for any commitment to fund 
existing First Nations child and welfare services. It also perpetuates the ineffective 
tripartite funding discussions between provincial governments, the federal 
government, and Indigenous communities which have previously resulted in 
“jurisdictional hot-potato” whereby both federal and provincial governments fail 
to provide funding to Indigenous communities.64 Also lacking are provisions 
regarding mechanisms to ensure federal and provincial compliance with the 
legislation and regulations as well as a system for data collection and reporting, 
which would be essential to determining whether or not the new legislation is in 
fact effective in achieving its purpose of lowering apprehension rates.65 Pam 
Palmater wrote in an article of April 5 that the Act risks “continuing the status 
quo.” She critiques that “what is offered is delegated authority under federal 
jurisdiction, which is conditional on agreement with the provinces.” She further 
elucidates that First Nation jurisdiction and laws in relation to child welfare are 
limited extensively by the legislation, severely diminishing its potential to truly 
recognize First Nations’ inherent right to self-government.66 
While the effect of the Act is yet to be seen, several provinces and territories 
have already recognized custom adoption in various ways. The impact of these 
various forms of recognition is surveyed below. As indicated above, as long as 
the provincial and territorial statutory regimes are not in conflict with or 
inconsistent with the federal Act, they remain operative. 
Northwest Territories 
The Northwest Territories was the first jurisdiction to recognize custom 
adoption through legislation. Prior to statutory recognition, families sought 
recognition from the courts. Much of the early jurisprudence on custom adoption 
is from the Northwest Territories, starting in 1961 with the Territorial Court 
decision Re Katie’s Adoption Petition.67 
 
64 Naiomi Walqwan Metallic et al, “Special Report—An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis 
Children, Youth and Families: Does Bill C-92 Make the Grade?” Yellowhead Institute (21 March 2019), 
online: <https://yellowheadinstitute.org/bill-c-92-analysis/>. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Pamela Palmater, “Bill C-92’s Indigenous child welfare act risks continuing the status quo” (5 April 2019) 
rabble.ca (blog), online: <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/indigenous-nationhood/2019/04/bill-c-92s-
indigenous-child-welfare-act-risks>. 
67 Re Katie’s Adoption Petition, [1961] NWTJ No. 2, 32 DLR (2d) 686. 
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In Re Katie’s Adoption Petition, Justice Sissons recognizes “adoptions in 
accordance with Indian or Eskimo custom” as having the same effect as an 
adoption made under the Child Welfare Ordinance.68 Justice Sissons states that 
“although there may be some strange features in Eskimo adoption custom which 
the experts cannot understand or appreciate, it is good and has stood the test of 
many centuries and these people should not be forced to abandon it.”69 He 
explains that these applications are made to the court “because the white man 
says there should be an adoption order, and because it is well to have something 
of court record establishing the adoption and proving it for purposes of family 
allowances, school registration, succession, and to avoid dispute or question.”70 
In the 1972 Territorial Court decision Re Deborah E4-789, Justice Morrow 
describes custom adoption as “the most outstanding characteristic of their culture 
and appears to outrank marriage and hunting rights.”71 Justice Morrow explains 
that there is always a reason for custom adoptions “based on good sense”, 
providing examples ranging from ill health or lack of caregiving capability of the 
birth mother to the desire of extended kin to raise a child.72 He says “the white 
culture could learn a lot from these customs - the Eskimos have what we are 
trying to legislate.”73 
The “good sense” of custom adoption was incorporated into Justice 
Marshall’s precedential summary in the 1983 Northwest Territories Supreme 
Court decision Re Tagornak.74 Justice Marshall lists criteria to be applied by the 
court when a custom adoption case comes before it:  
a) that there is consent of natural and adopting parents; b) that 
the child has been voluntarily placed with the adopting parents; 
c) that the adopting parents are indeed native or entitled to rely 
on native custom; and d) that the rationale for native custom 
adoptions is present in this case as in Re Deborah.75 
 
68 Ibid at 687. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid at 688. 
71 Re Deborah E4-789, [1972] 3 WWR 194 at para 19, (sub nom Re Tucktoo and Kitchooalik) 27 DLR (3d) 225. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Re Tagornak, [1984] 1 CNLR 185 at para 12, 23 ACWS (2d) 469. 
75 Ibid. 
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Custom adoption was recognized by statute in 1995 when the Aboriginal 
Custom Adoption Recognition Act (“ACARA”) came into force.76 This statutory 
model is an administrative model with a registration system as opposed to a 
judicial model.77 After gathering biographical details about the child and 
statements from the adoptive parents and any other interested person, an 
adoption commissioner issues a certificate recognizing the adoption.78 This 
recognition does not allow custom adoptions to take place, it only records that 
they have occurred.79 The preamble describes the purpose of the ACARA as 
“desiring, without changing aboriginal customary law respecting adoptions, to set 
out a simple procedure by which a custom adoption may be respected and 
recognized.”80 
The Northwest Territories Supreme Court discusses the effect of a custom 
adoption registration in the 2015 decision Tinqui v Nitsiza.81 Justice V.A. Schuler 
states that while the ACARA “provides a means of recognizing a custom 
adoption; it does not specify the consequences of such adoptions.”82 However, 
she explains that the status of parent and child are clearly contemplated by the 
act. Section 2(2)(b) of the act requires “a statement by the adoptive parents,” and 
the prescribed form of custom adoption certificate under section 3(2) refers to 
the child having been adopted by the adoptive parents “as their child” in 
accordance with Aboriginal customary law.83 Custom adoption is understood by 
this legislation as creating a parent-child relationship, making the consequence of 
custom adoption registration a change in parent and child status. 
The ACARA has a role in strengthening Indigenous self-governance over 
child welfare. Moving away from the conflation with settler state adoption seen 
in early jurisprudence, the ACARA sets out a simple procedure to respect and 
recognize custom adoption without changing customary law. To provide legal 
consequences to the registration of custom adoptions, the court has interpreted 
 
76 Aboriginal Custom Adoption Recognition Act, SNWT 1994, c 26 [ACARA].   
77 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45. 
78 ACARA, supra note 76, ss 2(1), 2(2). 
79 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 44. 
80 ACARA, supra note 76, Preamble. 
81 Tinqui v Nitsiza, 2015 NWTSC 71, 266 ACWS (3d) 119. 
82 Ibid at para 20. 
83 Ibid. 
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custom adoption certificates as changing parent and child status. While this 
interpretation is typically in line with how Indigenous communities understand 
the effects of custom adoption, attention must be paid to Indigenous peoples’ 
own understanding of their customary laws. It is important that the court defers 
to Indigenous communities’ understanding of custom adoption and its effects by 
maintaining family ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. To respect 
customary law and custom adoption as an exercise of self-governance over child 
welfare, application of the ACARA must fulfil its purpose to respect and 
recognize custom adoption and refrain from prescribing legal consequences 
without involving Indigenous communities. 
Nunavut 
When Nunavut was established in 1999, all Northwest Territories legislation 
then in force became the independent statutes of Nunavut.84 Nunavut has not 
chosen to change the ACARA.85 The same registration system applies in the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Nunavut has the highest incidence of 
custom adoption in Canada.86 From 2008 to 2015, eighty-five to ninety-nine 
percent of total annual adoptions were custom adoptions registered under the 
ACARA.87 
The 2002 Nunavut Court of Justice decision K (SK) v S (J) was the first 
opportunity for Nunavut to interpret and apply the recognition legislation.88 The 
court heard evidence from Elders about the tradition of custom adoption and 
how the process has become “diluted” as a result of “rapid cultural changes taking 
place in Northern communities.”89 Justice B.A. Browne described the common 
indicators of custom adoption that differentiate it from settler state adoption, 
including the continuing relationship between the birth parents and the child, and 
the possibility of the child returning to them.90 The substance of a custom 
adoption is the intention of the two sets of parents and their agreement regarding 
 
84 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 45. 
85 Duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28. 
86 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 64. 
87 A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S), 2017 NUCJ 5 para 18, 277 ACWS (3d) 552 [A (I)]. 
88 K (SK) v S (J), 2002 NUCJ 2, 170 ACWS (3d) 846. 
89 Ibid at paras 15, 24, 46. 
90 Ibid at para 51. 
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childrearing responsibilities.91 Justice B.A. Browne explains custom adoption as 
“part of the community process - an informal way a community looks after 
itself.”92  
The 2017 Nunavut Court of Justice decision A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S) 
provided an opportunity to “draw stark attention to continuing issues presented 
by the application of ACARA.”93 In this case, all parties agreed the Custom 
Adoption Certificate in question “should be vacated on the basis that the 
fundamental concept of procedural fairness of notice to interested parties was 
breached.”94 Due to a misunderstanding, a paternal grandmother applied for and 
was wrongly issued a Custom Adoption Certificate for her infant 
granddaughter.95 The Custom Adoption Commissioner was unable to contact 
either the mother or the maternal grandparents “because she did not have 
sufficient minutes on her cell phone to call them.”96 As explained by Justice S. 
Cooper, procedure for the Commissioner to follow is not provided in the 
ACARA or its regulations, and the Custom Adoption Commissioner’s Manual is 
“nothing more than a guide to filling out forms.”97 Lack of procedure, training, 
and resources (evidenced by reliance on personal funds for telephone charges) 
were highlighted in this case.98 Justice S. Cooper echoes recommendations made 
by the Nunavut Law Reform Commission regarding custom adoption: 
standardized policy, increased documentation, and notice to interested parties 
and written consents are all needed. 
Nunavut’s interpretation and application of the ACARA has been 
promising for strengthening self-governance over child welfare. The court 
recognizes the effects of custom adoption as distinct from settler state adoption, 
not requiring sameness for recognition. Custom adoption is understood as part 
of the way a community looks after itself. The jurisprudence also highlights the 
urgent need for increased support and funding to ensure application of the 
 
91 Ibid at para 17. 
92 Ibid at para 38. 
93 A (I), supra note 87 at para 75. 
94 Ibid at para 69. 
95 Ibid at paras 4-6. 
96 Ibid at para 8. 
97 Ibid at para 39. 
98 Ibid at para 44. 
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ACARA is successful. Robust statutory recognition is only the first step. 
Standardized procedure, training, and resources must accompany statutory 
recognition. 
British Columbia 
Prior to British Columbia’s statutory recognition of custom adoption, the 
1993 BC Court of Appeal decision Casimel v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia 
determined that custom adoption was a section 35 Constitutional right.99 The 
custom adoption at issue was considered “an integral part of the distinctive 
culture of the Stellaquo Band of the Carrier People (though, of course, other 
societies may well have shared the same custom or variations of that custom).”100 
British Columbia gave statutory recognition to custom adoption in 1996 
through a provision in its Adoption Act.101 The provision provides a judicial model, 
as opposed to an administrative model.102 Section 46(1) states, “On application, 
the court may recognize that an adoption of a person effected by the custom of 
an Indian band or aboriginal community has the effect of an adoption under this 
Act.”103 
This provision was first interpreted and applied in the 1998 BC Supreme 
Court decision Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 1994-09-040399.104 Justice 
Grist uses the four factors set out in the 1983 Northwest Territories Supreme 
Court decision Re Tagornak as the criteria for declaration of an adoption by 
Aboriginal custom:  
a) that there is consent of natural and adopting parents; b) that 
the child has been voluntarily placed with the adopting parents; 
c) that the adopting parents are indeed native or entitled to rely 
on native custom; and d) that the rationale for native custom 
adoptions is present.105  
 
99 Casimel v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1993] BCWLD 2373, 106 DLR (4th) 720. 
100 Ibid at para 52. 
101 Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 46. 
102 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45. 
103 Adoption Act, supra note 101, s 46(1). 
104 Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 1994-09-040399, [1998] 4 CNLR 7, 45 RFL (4th) 458 [Birth 
Registration]. 
105 Ibid at paras 11, 22. 
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Justice Grist interprets recognition under this provision as requiring that “the 
relationship created by custom must be understood to create fundamentally the 
same relationship as that resulting from an adoption order under Part 3 of the 
Act.”106 The BC Supreme Court discusses this fifth “fundamentally the same 
relationship” criteria in the 2000 decision Prince v Canada.107 Justice Meiklem 
explains that while the recognition provision “does not require proven symmetry 
between the effects of adoption by aboriginal custom adoption and adoption 
under the Act as a prerequisite for the declaration contemplated, the Court must 
obviously be satisfied that it is recognizing an adoption already effected, and not 
creating a fundamentally different relationship or status.”108 To satisfy the court 
that custom adoption has created “fundamentally the same relationship”, the 
applicant will have to establish “both the nature of the custom generally, and that 
the adoption of the applicant pursuant to that custom was effected.”109 
BC’s recognition of custom adoption is problematic in its conflation of 
Indigenous custom adoption with settler state adoption. The effects of custom 
adoption frequently differ from those generated by settler state adoption. Two of 
the most significant differences are that custom adoption rarely severs family ties 
and permanency is not emphasized.110 Settler state adoption and custom adoption 
will not always “create fundamentally the same relationship.”111 The 
interpretation in Prince provides some nuance by not requiring “proven 
symmetry” between the effects of custom adoption and settler state adoption, but 
then affirms the “fundamentally the same relationship” language.112 Recognition 
that fails to incorporate differences between the two forms of adoption does not 
adequately respect custom adoption as an exercise of Indigenous self-governance 
over child welfare. This sameness requirement also contradicts early 
jurisprudence recognizing custom adoption as a section 35 Constitutional right. 
Indigenous communities must be able to determine the effects of custom 
adoption as distinct from settler state adoption. 
 
106 Ibid at para 15. 
107 Prince v Canada, 2000 BCSC 1066 paras 38-40, 97 ACWS (3d) 1148 [Prince]. 
108 Ibid at para 38. 
109 Ibid at para 40. 
110 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 23-24. 
111 Birth Registration, supra note 104 at para 15. 
112 Prince, supra note 107 at paras 38-40. 
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Yukon 
Yukon recognized custom adoption in 2008 through a provision in the Child 
and Family Services Act.113 This statute provides a judicial model, as opposed to an 
administrative model.114 Section 134(1) states: “On application, the court may 
declare that there has been an adoption of a person in accordance with the 
customs of a First Nation.”115 As a result of the custom adoption, the court may 
declare child and parent status, and “further declarations as to rights and 
responsibilities as a result of the custom adoption, including the rights and 
responsibilities of the birth parents, adoptive parents or the person.”116 These 
further declarations are made by relying on Indigenous custom.117 There is not 
yet any reported jurisprudence interpreting or applying this provision in the 
legislation. 
Yukon’s recognition of custom adoption appears more promising than the 
recognition in BC’s legislation and jurisprudence. Instead of conflating 
Indigenous custom adoption and settler state adoption, this provision 
acknowledges and provides for recognition of Indigenous custom adoption’s 
distinct effects. Recognition of custom adoption is not contingent upon it being 
functionally equivalent to settler state adoption. The court is not limited to 
declarations of effects that mirror those of settler state adoption. It is significant 
that this legislation provides for continuing rights and responsibilities of birth 
parents, which does not sever family ties as in settler state adoption. This 
provision has the potential, depending on its interpretation and application in 
future jurisprudence, to strengthen Indigenous self-governance over child 
welfare. 
Nova Scotia 
Nova Scotia added a provision to the Children and Family Services Act in 2015 
to recognize custom adoption.118 A judicial model is provided, as opposed to an 
administrative model. As stated in section 78A(1), “Upon application, the court 
 
113 Child and Family Services Act, SY 2008, c 1, s 134 [CFSA]. 
114 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45. 
115 CFSA, supra note 113, s 134(1). 
116 Ibid, ss 134(2), 134(3). 
117 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 46. 
118 Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, s 78A. 
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may recognize that an adoption of a person in accordance with the custom of a 
band or an aboriginal community has the effect of an adoption under this Act.”119 
There is not yet any reported jurisprudence interpreting or applying this section 
of the act. 
Similar to the BC provision, Nova Scotia’s recognition conflates Indigenous 
custom adoption with settler state adoption. Custom adoption will rarely have the 
same effect as settler state adoption due to its commonly observed characteristics 
of maintaining family ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. The term 
‘may’ could enable this provision to be interpreted in a manner that recognizes 
fundamental distinctions between Indigenous custom adoption and settler state 
adoption. Since the court has the discretion to recognize that custom adoption 
has the effect of adoption under the act, it may also have the discretion to 
recognize custom adoption as having distinct effects. However, because of where 
‘may’ is located in the provision and how BC’s similar provision has been 
interpreted in BC jurisprudence, it is more likely that custom adoption will either 
be recognized as having the effect of adoption under the act or will not be 
recognized at all. Statutory recognition that requires custom adoption to mirror 
settler state adoption does not adequately respect the practice as an exercise of 
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. 
  
 
119 Ibid, s 78A(1). 
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Ontario 
Ontario’s revised Child, Youth and Family Services Act recognizes customary 
care.120 Customary care is defined in this legislation as “the care and supervision 
of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child by a person who is not the child’s parent, 
according to the custom of the child’s band or First Nations, Inuit or Métis 
community.”121 This legislation provides customary care subsidies to the person 
caring for the child upon declaration by the band or community of the customary 
care arrangement.122 In child protection proceedings, a society “shall make all 
reasonable efforts to pursue a plan for customary care for a First Nations, Inuk 
or Métis child.”123 The purposes provision states that “First Nations, Inuit and 
Métis peoples should be entitled to provide, wherever possible, their own child 
and family services.”124 
Ontario’s revised legislation may be a powerful tool for strengthening 
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. The purposes provision explicitly 
acknowledges self-governance over child and family services. Recognizing 
customary care acknowledges the often temporary nature of custom adoption, 
which does not result in severed family ties. The provision of customary care 
subsidies is an important support in ensuring Indigenous communities have the 
financial resources to exercise self-governance over child welfare. 
Quebec 
Quebec recognized custom adoption in 2017 through the assent to Bill 113, 
An act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption and the 
disclosure of information.125 The effects of Aboriginal customary adoptions are 
recognized “when carried out according to a custom that is in harmony with the 
principles of the interest of the child, the protection of the child’s rights and the 
consent of the persons concerned.”126 Aboriginal customary adoption certificates 
are issued by “a person or body domiciled in Quebec and designated by the 
 
120 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, SO 2017, c 14, Sched 1 [CYFSA]. 
121 Ibid, s 2(1). 
122 Ibid, s 71. 
123 Ibid, s 80. 
124 Ibid, s 1(2). 
125 Bill 113, An Act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption and the disclosure of 
information, 1st Sess, 41st Leg, Quebec, 2017 (assented to 16 June 2017), SQ 2017, c 12. 
126 Ibid, Explanatory Notes. 
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Aboriginal community or nation.”127 The competent authority must not be a party 
to the adoption.128 An Aboriginal customary adoption certificate states 
biographical information about the child, the family of origin, and the adopters.129 
The certificate will also specify any rights and obligations that subsist between the 
adoptee and their parent of origin.130 Conditions under Aboriginal custom may 
also be substituted for conditions for suppletive tutorship: the temporary 
delegation of parental authority to another family member.131 
The Cree Nation responded favourably to the adoption of Bill 113 in their 
press release, underlining its support for the collaborative approach to drafting 
this legislation.132 The collaborative approach resulted in amendments to the bill, 
including measures to recognize temporary customary adoptions.133 As stated by 
Dr. Matthew Coon Come, then Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees 
(Eeyou Istchee) and Chairman of the Cree Nation Government, “Bill 113 begins 
to harmonize provincial adoption legislation with Cree Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in relation to adoption matters and reflects the rights of Indigenous Nations 
to govern affairs regarding their children.”134 
Quebec’s recognition of custom adoption is an encouraging development. 
Drafted in consultation with Indigenous communities, the legislation supports 
self-governance over child welfare.135 It recognizes the temporary and more 
permanent manifestations of custom adoption and the continuing rights and 
obligations of the family of origin. The competent authority to issue Aboriginal 
customary adoption certificates are designated by Indigenous communities, 
providing them some control over custom adoption recognition procedures. The 
effects of custom adoption are determined by Indigenous custom, not by 
conflation with settler state adoption. Depending on future interpretation and 
 
127 Ibid, s 7. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid, s 3. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid, s 10. 
132 Grand Council of the Crees, Press Release, “Cree Nation Welcomes Customary Adoption into Quebec 





135 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 4. 
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application, Quebec’s statutory recognition may be effective in strengthening 
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. 
Remaining Provinces 
The remaining provinces do not recognize custom adoption in their 
legislation. 
New Brunswick’s Family Services Act discusses adoption of Aboriginal 
children in the context of disclosure and retaining Aboriginal rights.136 There is 
no mention of custom adoption. 
PEI’s Adoption Act makes no mention of Aboriginal children, nor custom 
adoption.137 The Child Protection Act makes many references to the adoption of 
Aboriginal children, including in the context of notice to bands in child protection 
proceedings and best interests of the child.138 However, there is no mention of 
custom adoption in this legislation. 
Alberta’s Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act includes many provisions 
regarding adoption of Aboriginal children.139 Cultural connection plans are 
emphasized but there is no mention of custom adoption.140 
Manitoba’s Adoption Act only references Aboriginal children in the context 
of disclosure of pre-adoption birth registrations.141 There is no mention of 
custom adoption. The Child and Family Services Authorities Act does not recognize 
custom adoption but the preamble states “the development and delivery of 
programs and services to First Nations, Metis and other Aboriginal people must 
respect their values, beliefs, customs and traditional communities.”142 
Saskatchewan’s Child and Family Services Act provides for Aboriginal child 
welfare agreements.143 The minister may enter into an agreement with a band for 
 
136 Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2. 
137 Adoption Act, SPEI 1992, c 1. 
138 Child Protection Act, SPEI 2000, c 3 (2nd Sess.), ss 2(2)(j), 12(3.1), 12(3.2), 13(7), 13(8), 18.1(1)(b), 
18.1(2)(b), 24(1.2), 27(1)(a.1), 27(1.1), 27(2)(a.1), 30(2), 32(2), 32(3), 35(1)(b), 37(2), 37(4), 39(2)(b). 
139 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c C-12, ss 2(p), 52(1)(1.3), 56(1)(1.2), 57.01, 58.1(g), 
63(1)(f), 63(3)(e), 70(1)(2.1), 71.1, 74.4(1). 
140 Ibid, s 63(1)(f). 
141 The Adoption Act, SM 1997, c 47, s 107.5(1). 
142 The Child and Family Services Authorities Act, SM 2002, c 35. 
143 The Child and Family Services Act, SS 1989-90, c C-7.2, s 61. 
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the administration of the act as an agency or for the exercise by the agency of 
those powers of the minister pursuant to the act.144 There is no other reference 
to Aboriginal children and no mention of custom adoption. 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Adoption Act states that it shall be read and 
applied in conjunction with the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, with this 
agreement having precedence in the event of conflict or inconsistency.145 There 
is no other reference to Aboriginal children and no mention of custom adoption. 
The Children and Youth Care and Protection Act146 and Children’s Law Act147 replicate 
the Labrador Inuit rights provision, but again make no further reference to 
Aboriginal child and no mention of custom adoption. 
Strengthening Self-Governance Over Child Welfare 
Above all, custom adoption is a matter of Indigenous governance and 
jurisdiction.148 It is the application of Indigenous law on Indigenous land, by and 
for Indigenous people. It is “an expression of First Nations self-determination, 
self-government and jurisdiction over families, children, identity, culture and 
language.”149 While custom adoption does not depend on recognition in 
legislation for its existence, recognition of its effects has practical advantages for 
parents, children, and communities.150 Robust statutory recognition strengthens 
self-governance over child welfare. Statutory recognition supports the resurgence 
of Indigenous customary law. Self-governance is strengthened when the 
conflation of diverse practices is rejected, and recognition is accompanied by 




145 Adoption Act, SNL 2013, c A-3.1, s 3. 
146 Children and Youth Care and Protection Act, SNL 2010, c C-12.2, s 3. 
147 Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-13, s 5.1. 
148 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 135. 
149 Ibid at 103. 
150 Ibid. 
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Resurgence of Indigenous Customary Law 
Custom adoption is part of the resurgence of Indigenous customary law. It 
is the rejection of the imposition of colonial laws and the assertion of an 
Indigenous community’s own customary laws and practices. Custom adoption is 
informed by various Indigenous worldviews, which often value extended kin and 
community responsibility. Instead of blaming individual parents for personal 
deficiencies, Indigenous caregiving practices acknowledge root causes and 
systemic difficulties. Rather than severing ties and emphasizing permanency, 
custom adoption strengthens community relationships and allows for temporary 
arrangements. Indigenous communities use their own laws to govern their own 
children-and-kin relations. 
While custom adoption does not depend on recognition for its existence, 
recognition is a valuable tool in asserting self-governance. As explained by the 
prominent Indigenous scholar John Borrows, “Indigenous legal traditions will 
more positively permeate our societies if their power is acknowledged by official 
state and community institutions.”151 Governments and courts should “help 
create the conditions for the more explicit implementation of Indigenous legal 
traditions and community values.”152 The settler state should not be at the centre 
of Indigenous law resurgence, instead it should supplement work being done in 
Indigenous communities.153 It is at the discretion of Indigenous communities to 
define and adapt custom adoption to respond to their traditional values and 
current needs.154 It is the task of legislatures to give it a place in legislation.155 
In the absence of formal recognition, Indigenous custom adoptions exist in 
a liminal space. Custom adoptions have always taken place in Indigenous 
communities, but their undefined legal status within Canadian law has resulted in 
uncertainty, leading to undue complications and obstacles.156 The settler state has 
routinely failed to recognize the participation of extended kin in childrearing as 
an expression of self-governance over child welfare.157 Without recognition of 
 
151 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 178. 
152 Ibid at 180-181. 
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154 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 125-126. 
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156 Ibid at 101. 
157 Kline, supra note 14 at 331. 
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Indigenous forms of caregiving, the settler state justifies its intrusion into 
Indigenous communities through child protection rationales. Properly 
understood as an alternative to settler state child protection, statutory recognition 
of custom adoption can prevent state intrusion into Indigenous communities that 
are employing their own means of caring for their children. Statutory recognition 
of custom adoption provides “an additional measure of legal certainty.”158 
Conflation of Diverse Practices Must Be Rejected 
Recognition which conflates custom adoption with settler state adoption 
must be rejected. Further, reduction of diverse custom adoption practices in 
different Indigenous communities to a flattened essentialist form is an 
impoverished recognition. If statutory recognition requires custom adoption to 
mirror the effects of settler state adoption, it strips it of the fundamental 
characteristics that make it an alternative to the incompatible settler state regime. 
Requiring assimilation to the settler state regime does not respect custom 
adoption as an exercise of Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. 
British Columbia and Nova Scotia are two examples of statutory recognition 
which conflate custom adoption with settler state adoption. Legislation in both 
provinces recognizes custom adoption as having “the effect of an adoption under 
this Act.” The jurisprudence in BC goes further in interpreting this provision by 
stating custom adoption must “create fundamentally the same relationship” as 
settler state adoption.159 These provisions do not understand custom adoption as 
a process unique from settler state adoption. Recognition is permitted so long as 
Indigenous caregiving mirrors the existing statutory regime. These recognition 
provisions fail to recognize and respect custom adoption as self-governance. 
Effects of custom adoption must be defined by Indigenous communities and 
understood from their worldviews. 
Yukon and Quebec are two examples of more promising statutory 
recognition. Yukon’s legislation does not limit court declarations to effects that 
mirror those of settler state adoption and provides for continuing rights and 
responsibilities of the birth parents. Quebec’s legislation also allows for 
 
158 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 1. 
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continuing rights and obligations of the family of origin and recognizes the 
temporary and more permanent manifestations of custom adoption. These 
examples of statutory recognition are more robust in their recognition of custom 
adoption as an exercise of self-governance, with its effects determined by 
Indigenous communities and custom. 
Statutory recognition must also understand the diversity of custom adoption 
practices. The effects of custom adoption vary among Indigenous 
communities.160 The risk of reduction and essentialism accompanies statutory 
recognition. Custom adoption is an exercise of self-governance which will 
manifest itself differently depending on the particular Indigenous community and 
custom. 
Consultation with Indigenous communities is required to prevent both the 
conflation of custom adoption with settler state adoption and the reduction of 
diverse custom adoption practices to a flattened essentialist form. The objective 
of consultation is not to negotiate but to document and analyze.161 Documenting 
the specific custom adoption practices in diverse Indigenous communities assists 
in crafting appropriate and beneficial legislation.162 Any proposed legislation for 
custom adoption recognition must be subject to prior consultation and 
collaboration between government authorities and representatives of relevant 
Indigenous communities.163 
Quebec’s collaborative approach to drafting their legislation is an 
encouraging example of placing consultations at the forefront of statutory 
recognition. Quebec’s Working Group on Customary Adoption in Aboriginal 
Communities held consultations with Indigenous communities to discuss values 
and issues surrounding custom adoption.164 The results of the consultations were 
“central in the determination of reference points and parameters to guide the 
recognition of effects of customary adoptions within and for the purposes of the 
Civil Code and other provincial legislation.”165 As discussed in the press release 
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56 STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS CUSTOM ADOPTION Vol. 28 
 
from the Cree Nation, the collaborative approach to drafting this legislation 
resulted in amendments that better reflected distinct forms and effects of custom 
adoption.166 Other legislatures should follow Quebec’s collaborative approach in 
creating robust statutory recognition of custom adoption which strengthens 
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. 
Recognition Must Be Accompanied by Control and Support 
Settler state recognition can play an important role in strengthening self-
governance, but it must be accompanied by support and ceded control. There 
can be a fine line between government recognition and government 
interference.167 Custom adoption does not require settler state recognition for it 
to exist. The role of the settler state must remain limited to after-the-fact 
recognition. Recognition cannot be co-opted as a way of interfering with 
Indigenous communities and altering their customary law. As explained by John 
Borrows, “Governments and courts should not be trusted with more power than 
is necessary to create a sphere of recognition and enforcement.”168 Custom 
adoption is an exercise of self-governance and Indigenous communities must 
remain in control at all stages of the process. 
After recognition has been written into legislation, judicial interpretation 
and application can be an insidious form of interference with Indigenous custom. 
The formal implementation of Indigenous customary law by the courts must not 
undermine work being done in Indigenous communities.169 Judicial interpretation 
of the effects of custom adoption must be informed by Indigenous custom and 
determined by Indigenous communities. It is particularly important that the 
judiciary is educated about the differences between custom adoption and settler 
state adoption to ensure the risk of conflating them is minimized.  
The choice of statutory model also has implications for the risk of judicial 
interference. While the judicial model uses the judiciary to determine whether a 
custom adoption has occurred and what its legal effects are, the administrative 
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model with a registration system minimizes the role of the judiciary.170 The 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Quebec are examples of the administrative 
model of statutory recognition. The judiciary still has a role in interpreting the 
recognition provisions, but it does not operate as gatekeeper. The administrative 
model is more accessible and less expensive for Indigenous communities and 
emphasizes their control over the recognition process. 
An additional measure of control is the choice of who issues a custom 
adoption certificate. Quebec’s legislation provides a promising example by 
allowing the competent authority to issue an Aboriginal customary adoption 
certificate to be “designated by the Aboriginal community or nation.”171 This 
choice in designation works to ensure that the competent authority is well 
informed about custom adoption, understanding it as an exercise of self-
governance, with its effects determined by Indigenous communities and custom. 
It is also essential that statutory recognition of custom adoption is 
accompanied by support. Financial support is required to ensure that Indigenous 
communities can exercise their inherent right to self-governance.172 When an 
Indigenous family customarily adopts a child, they are not provided with financial 
support to care for the additional child in their household.173 This financial 
support must be provided. Along with financial support for individual families 
who customarily adopt, broader support is required for development of 
Indigenous regimes and mechanisms which may be required to implement a 
modern expression of self-governance over custom adoption.174 A lack of 
resources, such as housing shortages and poor living conditions, also impacts the 
ability of Indigenous communities to exercise self-governance over child welfare. 
Financial support is the joint responsibility of the provinces and the federal 
government.175 It is crucial that recognition is accompanied by financial support. 
The Ontario legislation provides one example of financial support 
accompanying statutory recognition. Upon declaration by the Indigenous band 
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or community of a customary care arrangement, a customary care subsidy is made 
available to the person caring for the child.176 This provision acknowledges the 
ongoing support required beyond mere recognition. Other provinces, territories, 
and the federal government should follow the example of Ontario and provide 
financial support to Indigenous families and communities exercising self-
governance over child welfare. 
Sufficient funding of the statutory recognition process is also necessary to 
ensure that the integrity of custom adoption is not undermined by improper 
recognition. The Nunavut case A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S) highlights the need for 
adequate funding to ensure application of recognition legislation is successful.177 
In A(I) (Guardian of) v K(S), due to inadequate resources and training, a Custom 
Adoption Certificate was issued when a custom adoption did not actually 
occur.178 All parties to the litigation agreed there had been a misunderstanding 
regarding the custom adoption, and the certificate should be vacated since the 
Custom Adoption Commissioner did not provide notice to the interested 
parties.179 The statutory recognition process cannot strengthen self-governance 
over child welfare if it is not adequately funded and administered. 
CONCLUSION 
In the sphere of child welfare, Canada has already facilitated multiple 
regimes that have torn Indigenous families apart and perpetuated the destructive 
chokehold of colonialism. In the words of Cindy Blackstock, “Reconciliation to 
me is about not having to say sorry a second time.”180 It is time, then, that Canada 
adverts to the wisdom that Indigenous communities themselves hold in relation 
to child welfare. Custom adoption is an Indigenous alternative to the failing settler 
state child welfare system. It is a rejection of imposed colonial laws, which are 
incompatible with Indigenous worldviews and their ideas of the family. Custom 
 
176 CYFSA, supra note 120, s 71. 
177 A (I), supra note 87 at para 44. 
178 Ibid at paras 4-6. 
179 Ibid at para 69. 
180 Interview of Cindy Blackstock by Amnesty International Canada [nd], Amnesty Canada (blog), online: 
<https://www.amnesty.ca/blog/reconciliation-means-not-having-to-say-sorry-a-second-time-
conversation-with-cindy-blackstock-f>. 
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adoption fundamentally differs from settler state adoption by maintaining family 
ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. The role of statutory 
recognition in strengthening self-governance over child welfare depends heavily 
on whether the recognition conflates custom adoption with settler state adoption. 
Custom adoption must be respected as an exercise of self-governance, with its 
effects determined by Indigenous communities and custom. When the conflation 
of diverse practices is rejected and recognition is accompanied by control and 
support, statutory recognition strengthens the resurgence of customary law and 
self-governance over child welfare. 
Custom adoption is only one aspect of larger self-governance goals. It is 
“part of the broader struggle for Indigenous communities’ right to completely 
self-govern.”181 Statutory recognition of custom adoption is not enough. Further 
recognition of the inherent right to self-governance is necessary for ongoing 
reconciliation. Robust statutory recognition of custom adoption may be used as 
a tool for Indigenous communities in demanding further recognition of self-
governance in other areas.
 
181 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 33. 
 
 
 
  
